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One of the most striking aspects of the 1960s and 1970s was the dramatic increase in 
the volume of international financial activity and the acceleration of the pace of 
financial innovation.  Accompanying these two linked developments was the 
geographical dispersion of financial activity and the rise of new international financial 
centres.  This paper examines this process in Hong Kong and Tokyo. Particular 
emphasis is placed on how the very different regulatory frameworks of these two 
cities affected their prospects and the different models of their emergence as IFCs.  
For Tokyo, the case of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank is used as an example of the 
nature of foreign bank activity. The paper concludes with some reflections on how the 
historical record informs our understanding of the performance of these two centres 
during the 1990s. 
 
 1
Comparison of Hong Kong and Tokyo as international banking centres 
 
Hong Kong and Tokyo both emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as important 
international financial centres but the basis for their prominence was very different.  
Hong Kong had a long historical legacy as a financial and commercial centre for Asia 
since the mid-19th Century.  It is a small, resource-poor island entrepot that developed 
its strength in manufacturing industry only in the post-war period.  Most importantly, 
the regulatory environment with its low tax rate, free exchange market and 
convertibility was ideal for international financial and commercial activity in the 
otherwise tightly regulated international system of the 1950s and 1960s.  It operated 
as a net importer of capital as well as financing trade and payments throughout Asia.  
     Japan, in contrast was already a highly developed industrial nation by the time of 
the second world war, experiencing a meteoric rise to prominence following the Meiji 
restoration of 1868 and playing one of the most successful games of ‘catch up’ in 
terms of industrialisation in history.  Also in direct contrast to Hong Kong, the 
Japanese government operated a tightly regulated domestic financial system to 
promote the mobilisation of capital for domestic expansion in the post-war period.  
Exchange and trade controls, particularly controls on capital flows, narrowed the 
opportunity for both foreign banks and Japanese banks to offer international financial 
services.  In the 1950s and 1960s capital was scarce in Japan, but once the floating 
exchange rate system was introduced in 1971, Japan found itself with considerable 
surplus funds and a sharply appreciating currency that generated pressure from 
Japanese banks for liberalisation of controls to allow profitable utilisation abroad. 
Japan’s foreign exchange reserves grew from $US2b March 1968 to $US18b by 
March 1973.  Continued exchange controls drove Japanese banks to the Eurodollar 
market to borrow short term for international lending.  From the mid-1970s 
international financial transactions were gradually liberalised, allowing the huge 
Japanese banks to make their presence felt in international markets to a much greater 
extent and pushing Tokyo to its prominence as an international financial centre to 
rival Hong Kong.  
     Foreign bank presence has always been marginal and controlled in Japan, despite 
the initiative to open an offshore banking centre in Tokyo from 1986. International 
financial activity has also not attracted the consistent support of a government whose 
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priority was domestic industrial growth.  In addition to government regulation, the 
close relationship between business and banks and the cultural barriers to entry by 
foreign banks has inhibited internationalisation. For all these reasons, the cost of 
doing business remained much higher in Tokyo than in Hong Kong.  By the 1990s 
Hong Kong had more foreign banks and insurance companies, greater cross-border 
credit to non-banks, syndicated loans and note-issuing facilities and qualified 
actuaries. However, Hong Kong’s position was weaker relative to Tokyo when other 
financial activities are considered, especially the stock exchange and derivatives 
market which are limited in scope. 2
     A result of their different historical and economic foundations is that the pattern of 
international banking for Japan is different than that of Hong Kong. Most importantly, 
Hong Kong was primarily a host for foreign banks while Tokyo was primarily a base 
for Japanese banks’ international activities.  Under the protection of administrative 
controls in the 1950s and 1960s Japanese banks became very large very quickly, and 
many operated extensive branch networks in overseas international financial centres 
to channel funds back to Japan. As Jao notes, ‘the eminent status of Tokyo as a Global 
Financial Centre derives basically from the sheer size of Japan’s domestic economy, 
banking system and financial markets, in which entry barriers are pervasive and 
significant’ and not from an outward international focus by institutions in Tokyo 
itself.3   In 1970 Tokyo had 17 banks in the top 300 while for Hong Kong there was 
only HSBC.4  By 1970, Japanese banks had 35 branches or representative offices in 
international financial centres around the world, while Hong Kong banks had only 7.5 
By 1971 the stock of Japanese overseas FDI in banking, insurance and commerce 
amounted to just over US$2b, which was 21% of the total stock of Japanese FDI.6   
Hong Kong banks are generally much smaller, reflecting the size of the domestic 
economy.  The HSBC Group (referred to here as the Hongkong Bank) is Hong 
Kong’s only real international bank, although its extensive global reach means it is 
now one of the largest banks in the world.  
     Table 1 shows the relative position of Hong Kong and Tokyo in terms of foreign 
bank operations.  Hong Kong had more regional banks and more European banks as is 
evident in Table 2.  The latter were slower to branch in the early 1950s before 
restrictions on entry were enforced more rigorously in Japan and so they did not gain 
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a foothold in Tokyo until the market was liberalised in the 1970s.  Table 3 shows the 
movement in the ranking of Hong Kong and Tokyo as international banking centres. 
     A comparison between Hong Kong and Tokyo is to some extent a spurious 
exercise since one is comparing a small city-state to the capital city of one of the 
world’s largest economies. A further difficulty for comparison of Tokyo and Hong 
Kong is that there have always been considerable links between the two centres.  In 
the decades immediately after the war, these arose from the finance of trade between 
Hong Kong and Japan and between Japan and elsewhere in Asia. Because of controls 
imposed by the USA on China’s access to US$, and on US banks’ direct contact with 
the Chinese communist government, the Japan-China trade that emerged in the 1950s 
was denominated in sterling and arranged mainly through the Hongkong Bank. 
Japanese also used the free dollar market in Hong Kong in this period.  In the second 
half of 1952, for example, the Tokyo black market rate for US$ was about 5% below the 
Hong Kong rate because of the disposal of surplus US$ by Japanese.  As a result, 
arbitrageurs operated between the Hong Kong and Tokyo market, generally increasing 
the supply of US$ notes in Hong Kong.7
     Hong Kong’s regional role included being a vital early link for the recovery of 
Japan’s international trade.  From March 1948, Hong Kong operated a 2-way account 
system with Japan aimed at balanced bilateral trade and outstanding balances were 
converted to $US on a six-monthly basis.  The general pattern of the trade was that 
Hong Kong re-exported Chinese goods to Japan in exchange for imports of non-
essential Japanese products. This arrangement was particularly valuable for Japan in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s when Japan was very short of foreign exchange.  Most 
of Japan's trading partners would only import essential goods, but this was not the 
case for Hong Kong.  As a result, Hong Kong provided Japan with an opportunity to 
import essential raw materials in return for ‘exports of gastronomical delicacies and 
bazaar goods which no other country will take; and it pays her to buy at higher prices 
through Hong Kong commodities which she could get cheaper from the country 
which produces them’.8  Soon, however, Hong Kong became an irritant to the 
Japanese since the free exchange market allowed Hong Kong to re-export Japanese 
goods to the USA at cheaper prices than Japan could directly.9 In September 1953, for 
example, Hong Kong’s re-exports of Japanese goods to Thailand and Indonesia was 
running at a rate of £250,000 and £900,000 per month respectively.10
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      In the 1960s, the Hongkong Bank operated 4 branches in Japan while several 
Japanese banks opened in Hong Kong. The Bank of Tokyo replaced the pre-war 
Yokohama Specie Bank in Hong Kong after the war. In October 1962 the Dai-Ichi 
Bank bought one third of the capital of the Chekiang First Bank of Commerce in 
Hong Kong (an investment of Y126m) and appointed two Japanese officers to the 
bank’s board of directors.  The co-operation was intended to increase local and 
Southeast Asian foreign exchange operations.11 Sumitomo subsequently opened in 
Hong Kong in December 1962, an event which the Director described as realising ‘a 
10-year dream to set up an office in the economic centre of South East Asia’.12 Sanwa 
Bank opened a branch in 1964. 
     As a final observation, it must be noted that the integration of these two 
international banking centres has accelerated after Japan’s liberalisation.  In 1980 
Japan accounted for 5.5% and 5.7% of Hong Kong banks’ external bank liabilities 
and claims respectively.  By 1985, on the eve of the launch of Japan’s offshore 
market, these proportions had risen to 13% and by 1993 to 65%, representing about 
US$300b by 1993 compared with less than US$2b in 1980.13  There is no doubt that 
the acceleration of the offshore market in Tokyo has also had a positive impact on 
inter-bank transactions between Tokyo and Hong Kong. 
      One of the most important determinants of the development of international 
banking is the regulatory environment.  The contrasting experience of Hong Kong and 
Tokyo in the post war decades is a stark example of the importance of regulation and 
controls on international banking. Section II shows that contrary to the common 
stereotype, Hong Kong was not a completely liberal environment from 1965 and that 
in fact the acceleration of the IFC took place despite increased controls on the 
banking system.  Conversely, again contrary to the common stereotype, Section III 
will describe the considerable international activity in Tokyo before the relaxation of 
regulations began in the 1970s.  A final section concludes with a summary and some 
observations on the relevance of the historical record to events in the 1990s.  
 
II  Regulatory framework and developments in Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong’s role as a regional and international financial centre arose from the 
strong commercial heritage of banking and financial services, which continued to 
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dominate the activity in the colony throughout the 1950s and 1960s, and positioned 
Hong Kong as the regional centre for the exchange of information and expertise on 
Asian and Western market opportunities.   In this sense, Hong Kong clearly fits into 
the model of an IFC emerging from an international commercial entrepot.14 As Meyer 
notes, the continuity in Hong Kong’s century-long history as ‘the great Asian regional 
financial centre’ allowed it to transcend competitors such as Tokyo or Singapore after 
the opening of China at the end of the 1970s.15  
      In the post-war period, the importance of Hong Kong as an international banking 
centre shifted to a new level.  The absence of exchange control in the colony 
contrasted with a global environment of tight controls on capital account 
convertibility and fixed exchange rates.  I have argued elsewhere that the ‘window’ of 
opportunity that Hong Kong offered as a gap in the sterling area exchange control 
attracted substantial financial flows from North America and Europe as well as 
Asia.16  Hong Kong operated a freely convertible and floating exchange rate market 
for many regional currencies as well as for the US$.  This freedom from exchange 
control attracted inflows of capital from around the world as investors and traders 
sought to evade the extensive exchange controls that operated in their home 
countries.17  Low tax rates (15% corporate tax), the prevalent use of English in 
financial circles, as well as the application of English law and a well developed 
communications infrastructure all enhanced the attractions of Hong Kong as a 
regional headquarters for international companies including banks.  In addition, Hong 
Kong hosted a vibrant gold market and a stock exchange that generated international 
investment flows. 
     Immediately after the war, the Hong Kong authorities were very reluctant to 
regulate the financial and banking sector, and foreign and domestic banks were 
treated equally. Banking legislation was first introduced in 1948 after claims that 
small, under-capitalised banks were springing up in response to flight capital from 
China to engage in unstable speculative activity arising from the monetary and 
political collapse of China during the Civil War from 1946-4918. The Banking 
Ordinance of January 1948 defined ‘banking’ very loosely, and included many small 
institutions that provided only a limited range of financial services19.  There were no 
reserve requirements, nor statutory liquidity ratios.  So long as the HK$5000 license 
fee could be raised, individuals or groups were free to attract deposits and operate as 
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banks. Until the revision of the ordinance in 1965, therefore, there was no effective 
banking regulation. 
     A further regional advantage for Hong Kong in these years was the antipathy to 
international banking and financial activity that prevailed in neighbouring centres in 
Southeast Asia and also in Japan.  In Southeast Asia, this was a product of 
nationalistic governments that viewed international banking as inconsistent with 
strong indigenous development.  As independent governments took power throughout 
the region, they often sought to exclude immigrant Chinese and other foreign 
economic activity to protect indigenous interests.  The acceptance and indeed support 
of Chinese banking and enterprise by the Hong Kong government was in direct 
contrast to the hostile environment elsewhere and led to substantial inflows of capital 
as well as entrepreneurs to the colony. 
      Nine foreign banks established in Hong Kong before 1939 reopened their offices 
after 1945.   A further six foreign banks arrived in Hong Kong from 1948-57, and 
roughly two per year opened offices until 1965.  About half of the foreign banks 
opened additional branches beginning in 1959, so that by 1965 there were 46 
branches of foreign banks in Hong Kong, plus 17 local branches of the Chartered 
Bank.  After the Chartered Bank, Banque Belge pour l’Etranger had the most 
aggressive branching policy.  It opened its first branch in Hong Kong in 1935, its 
second in 1960, and had a total of five offices by 1965.  In addition, the Chinese 
government operated ten banks in Hong Kong, mainly to finance trade and 
remittances.20
     The regulatory environment in Hong Kong changed profoundly after banking 
crises in the early 1960s led banks and the authorities to believe that Hong Kong was 
‘over-banked’. A weak banking ordinance was introduced at the end of 1964 but it 
was tightened considerably after 1967 and provided for statutory liquidity ratios, 
provision for bad debts, and regular reporting to the Banking Commissioner.  In 
addition, after the banking crisis of 1965 (that involved the failure of 2 banks and the 
take-over of the largest Chinese-controlled bank) the government imposed a 
moratorium on new bank licenses.  It was lifted briefly in 1972 but foreign banks 
were restricted to having only one office of operation in the colony.  Barclays Bank 
was the only one to benefit from this brief respite and the moratorium was 
reintroduced in 1975 for a further three years.  Even after the moratorium was lifted, 
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incoming foreign banks were restricted to maintaining offices in only one building, 
(increased in September 1999 to 3 buildings), a restriction that lasted through to 
November 2001.  At the end of 1998 only 37 out of 144 foreign banks in Hong Kong 
had multi-branch status left over from the 1960s.21
     The second long-term outcome of the banking crises of the 1960s was the 
imposition of an interest rate agreement aimed at containing competition for deposits. 
This agreement was negotiated among the banks themselves at the instigation of the 
Hongkong Bank.22  The Financial Secretary was opposed to such inhibition of 
competition.  In the end, however, a scheme was finally agreed in July 1964 which 
established a ladder of rates with ‘basic’ interest rates offered by foreign banks and 
the leading Hong Kong banks, and a graduated scale for other categories of banks 
stepping up by ½% on the basic rate.23 It was designed to enable smaller banks to 
compete for deposits with the larger banks, but also to constrain such competition to 
avoid upward drift in interest rates.  The interest rate agreement remained in force in 
Hong Kong until July 2000, six years longer than controls on deposit rates in Japan.24
     With the rapid expansion of the international financial market in the 1960s and 
1970s, and the high rates of externally financed economic growth in many Asian 
countries, the demand for international banking and financial services in the region 
expanded.  The impact of the regulations in Hong Kong was to promote new 
institutions that operated outside the purview of the banking ordinance and the 
interest rate agreement.  In the early 1970s, the financial services sector experienced 
an unprecedented boom with over 2000 local and overseas non-banking financial 
institutions opening to meet the demand for the services of merchant banks and 
finance companies.  These so-called Deposit Taking Companies did not come under 
the Banking Ordinance nor the interest rate agreement and were left unregulated until 
a new DTC Ordinance was enacted in 1976, after which their number dropped 
dramatically.25  The moratorium on new bank licenses was lifted in 1978 and in the 
next four years the number of licensed banks increased from 74 to 128, the number of 
banking offices almost doubled from 759 to 1474, and the number of DTCs increased 
from 179 to over 350.  In this mushrooming environment the Ordinance was amended 
in 1981, leading to the Three Tiered System; licensed banks offering a full range of 
services, licensed DTCs and Registered DTCs.  The DTCs were not subject to the 
interest agreement but could not accept deposits less than HK$50,000. The 
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proliferation of financial institutions despite regulatory constraints suggests that the 
demand for wholesale banking was great enough to offset the costs of regulation.   
      A final factor inhibiting Hong Kong by the 1970s was the refusal of the Financial 
Secretary to lift the witholding tax of 15% on interest earned in Hong Kong.  In 1968 
the Singapore government abolished their 40% tax on interest earned on overseas 
bank deposits, thus allowing the Bank of America to launch the Asian Dollar Market 
and achieving a significant advantage over Hong Kong. In 1970, Hong Kong’s 
Financial Secretary, J.J. Cowperthwaite argued that the tax was low, that it did not 
apply to interest earned abroad by Hong Kong banks, and that Hong Kong had ‘no 
ambitions to be a tax haven nor to attract the kind of money that flows into tax 
havens.  We are not fond of gimmicks.’26 In the same interview, Cowperthwaite 
asserted that this was not a blow to Hong Kong’s role as an international financial 
centre since ‘the use of a substantial proportion of the Asian dollar deposits in 
Singapore are in practice managed by the Hong Kong offices of the banks 
concerned.’27 Nevertheless, the tax gave Singapore the advantage in the establishment 
of the off-shore Asian dollar market, and by 1980 Asian Currency Units accounted for 
65% of the total assets of the financial sector in Singapore.28  By 1982, the growth of 
the market prompted tax reductions in Hong Kong. By 1986, Hong Kong had 
surpassed Singapore in terms of the size of the Asian Dollar Market and Asian Dollar 
Bond issues.  
       In summary, the major regulatory attractions of Hong Kong were freedom from 
exchange control, non-discrimination against Chinese or foreign business, and relative 
political stability.  Even after the advent of current account convertibility by Europe, 
controls on capital flows remained prevalent and so Hong Kong’s advantage was not 
eliminated.  From 1965, however, controls on deposit interest rates, prudential 
regulation and barriers to entry were imposed.  Still, a surge of unregulated financial 
institutions that appeared in the early 1970s successfully evaded these controls, and it 
took several years for the regulatory authorities to respond.  Despite the increase in 
interference in the market from the mid-1960s, therefore, Hong Kong retained many 
of its advantages over Tokyo and Singapore through the 1970s, leaving it in a strong 
position to launch itself as China’s international financial centre from 1979. Table 3 
shows a fall in the ranking of Hong Kong in terms of foreign bank offices but this 
does not accurately reflect the foreign non-bank presence in the colony. 
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 Regulatory framework and developments in Tokyo 
 
Little is written specifically about international banking in Japan before the 
liberalisation process began in the 1970s.29  Certainly, regulatory constraints and the 
government’s preference for a protected market prevented Tokyo emerging as a 
regional or international financial centre in the 1960s in the way that Hong Kong did 
during that decade. However, the scarcity of capital drew banks in Tokyo into 
international financial markets despite the tight restrictions on the range of these 
operations. Controls on foreign banks’ operations in Japan were gradually relaxed but 
not eliminated until February 1985.  The domestic banking sector was also tightly 
controlled through administrative guidance and the compartmentalisation of banks 
into different categories in order to reduce competition and enhance lending to 
domestic industry.  Interest rates were usually high in the 1960s and the Bank of 
Japan rationed credit through window operations, to which foreign banks did not have 
access.  
     Yen-denominated bonds were not issued in Japan by non-residents until 1970 (so-
called samurai bonds) and foreign currency denominated bonds were not issued by 
non-residents until 1972 (so-called shogun bonds).  From 1973/74, the pressure for 
liberalisation of international financial flows arose from the increasing surplus in 
Japan that created a demand for overseas investment opportunities among banks and 
financial institutions, and calls from the USA to ‘internationalise’ the Yen.30  Also, 
the spread of Japanese banks into other IFCs put pressure on the Japanese government 
to relax its own barriers to entry as a reciprocal gesture.31 This section explores the 
development of regulation and the nature of international banking that did occur 
during these decades. 
     Immediately after the war, the Japanese banking system was reformed and banks 
were grouped functionally into city banks, local banks and various specialised lending 
institutions.  In 1953 the Ministry of Finance started to consider naming the Bank of 
Tokyo as Japan’s special foreign exchange bank.  During the war the Yokohama 
Specie Bank had performed this role exclusively and the Bank of Tokyo hoped to 
inherit this advantage.  This generated considerable hostility among the Bank of 
Tokyo’s rivals, who together handled two thirds of Japan’s foreign exchange business 
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in 1953 against 20% by the Bank of Tokyo.32  Nevertheless, in April 1954 the Bank 
of Tokyo was named the only specialised foreign exchange bank while a small group 
of 12 Class A banks were given foreign exchange bank status to allow them to engage 
in this business alongside their other activities. The Bank of Tokyo lost its specialised 
status only in 1996 after a merger with Mitsubishi Bank.  Because of its status as the 
only specialised foreign exchange bank, the Bank of Tokyo became Japan’s main 
international bank.  By 1961 it had 17 branches in the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, U.K., 
West Germany, Pakistan, India, Laos, Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong. It had 16 
other representative offices in Canada, Mexico, France, Belgium, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, 
India, Burma, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines and Australia, performing 
effectively the business executed by its predecessor, the Yokohama Specie Bank.   
     After the end of the US Occupation in 1952, branches of several other Japanese 
banks were opened in London, New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Karachi, Calcutta, 
Bangkok and Taiwan as well as Hong Kong. From 1963 Japanese banks were again 
allowed to open new branches abroad and overseas expansion accelerated.  The fact 
that foreign banks were prohibited from opening new branches in Tokyo while 
Japanese banks moved aggressively abroad did generate friction.33  In 1962 
Sumitomo bank was refused entry into Hong Kong until the Japanese government 
allowed the Hongkong Bank to open an office in Nagoya.34  In 1963 the Japanese 
government had to allow Singapore’s Overseas Union Bank to open a branch in 
Tokyo in return for letting Mitsui open a branch in Singapore.35  By January 1971, 
Japanese banks had 58 foreign branches and owned 17 locally incorporated banks 
operating in international financial centres, most in London.   
     In 1970 the Ministry of Finance authorised the formation of two international 
banks made up of consortia of banks and securities companies to be located in 
London primarily to collect Eurodollars to finance Japanese companies moving into 
international markets. The International Joint Bank was formed by the Sanwa, Mitsui 
and Kangyo Banks and Nomura Securities, and the Japan International Investment 
Bank by the Fuji, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Tokai Banks and the Daiwa, Nikko and 
Yamaichi Securities.36  These initiatives were also part of the gradual blurring of the 
legal separation of security and banking business that had been imposed along the 
model of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1948.  Further liberalisation of the controls on 
Japanese banks’ movement overseas was begun in 1982. 
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     Trade and exchange began to be liberalised from 1959 and in April 1964 Japan 
adopted Article VII of the IMF, making the Yen convertible for current account 
purposes.  As in other countries at the time, short-term capital flows were considered 
dangerously destabilising and remained tightly controlled.37  Authorised foreign 
exchange banks administered the controls and residents were required to sell all 
foreign exchange to these banks within 10 days, with some exceptions for trading 
firms.  By this time 15 foreign banks and 12 Japanese banks were nominated Class A 
Banks dealing in international exchange.  The 50 or so Class B banks could act as 
intermediaries between their customers and Class A banks but were not permitted to 
have correspondent business with foreign banks abroad. From June 1962 exchange 
banks, including foreign banks, had to keep a ratio of specified liquid assets against 
liquid foreign liabilities to curb short-term capital inflows with their inflationary 
effects.  The ratio was reduced from 25% to 15% in April 1966.  Foreigners could 
invest in share equity of Japanese companies up to 15% of total equity (10% of banks 
and utilities).  Long-term borrowing required permission, but this was relatively freely 
granted.  Outward flows of investment were allowed where it would demonstrably 
promote Japanese production and exports. 
     In the late 1940s Chase Manhattan, Bank of America and National City Bank were 
invited into Tokyo by Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers.38  Because of the 
domination of USA in SCAP and the importance of dollar financing, these banks 
played the most prominent role among foreign banks in Tokyo during the 1950s. They 
financed trade between the USA and Japan and were the depository for a substantial 
part of Japan’s central reserves.  By 1966 the Bank of America and First National City 
Bank each had 4 branches in Japan, while Chase Manhattan and Continental Illinois 
each had 2 branches.39 Manufacturers Hanover, Morgan Guaranty, and Chicago 
Crocker Citizens each had a representative office in Tokyo. As late as 1970, First 
National City Bank, Chase Manhattan and Bank of America controlled more than half 
of the foreign banking business in Tokyo.40  This domination was partly due to the 
fact that 90% of Japan’s exports and about 80% of imports were still invoiced in US$ 
in 1970.41  At the end of the 1960s the Chase was the largest and most profitable of 
the American banks, and was the depository of US$100m of the Bank of Japan’s 
central foreign exchange reserves.  These official deposits served as collateral for the 
US banks to open letters of credit for Japanese banks to cover imports from the 
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USA.42  However, when the Chase decentralised its management in 1979, the senior 
executive in charge of activities in the Far East moved to Hong Kong, not to Tokyo.43
    British banks like the Hongkong Bank, The Chartered Bank of India, Australia and 
China, and the Mercantile Bank of India operated on a much smaller scale, financing 
Japan’s trade with the sterling area countries like the UK, Australia and Hong Kong.  
The Hongkong Bank had 4 branches in Japan (Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama and Kobe).  
The Mercantile Bank opened in Tokyo and Osaka in 1949, and reaped the benefits of 
being the first foreign bank to open in the latter centre.44     
 
Constraints on foreign banks in Tokyo 
 
     In the 1950s and 1960s, the activities of foreign banks in Japan included providing 
loans and credits for industry and trade, including so-called Impact Loans (term loans 
in foreign currency guaranteed by local banks). The small deposit base for foreign 
banks, restrictions on borrowing from the Bank of Japan limited foreign banks’ yen-
denominated business.  Foreign banks also provided commercial services such as 
confirming letters of credit, and accepting drafts validated in overseas money markets, 
and acted as intermediaries for Japanese companies, arranging bond issues and 
investments.45 Through the 1960s, however, Japanese banks came to take over more 
of these duties themselves, squeezing out the foreign banks. In the debt oriented, bank 
dominated finance of industry, foreign banks made very little inroad against the 
domestic competition, comprising on only 1% of the advances to Japanese business 
by the 15 largest banks in Japan by 1970.46
     Although there was no legal discrimination against foreign banks, exchange 
controls and administrative practices limited entry and branch expansion. From 15 
foreign banks in 1964, the total had only reached 18 by 1969, operating 37 branches.  
It was widely acknowledged that many more banks wanted entry into the market but 
the Ministry of Finance kept a tight control on licenses until the end of the 1960s.  
There were fewer restrictions on representative offices, of which there were 23 in 
1968 and 35 in 1969.  From September 1970 foreign banks could enter Japan through 
joint ventures in which they had less than 50% equity, by expanding networks of their 
own branch offices in Japan, or by buying up to 15% of the shares of a Japanese bank.  
The Hongkong Bank manager complained that ‘in effect, however, this means very 
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little’ since approval of the Ministry of Finance was still required for extending 
branches under the Banking Law which was not affected by the new Foreign Capital 
Investment Law.47   
      Beyond direct regulations, high taxes and rising wages were major obstacles for 
operations in Tokyo. Corporate tax rate was raised from 35% to 36.75% in 1970 
compared to a 15% corporate tax rate in Hong Kong.  The labour unions were strong 
and militant throughout the 1950s and 1960s and managed to negotiate large annual 
wage rises.  The Hongkong Bank, for example, was hit by a strike in 1955, although it 
managed to keep its Tokyo office running with foreign staff brought in specially.48  
High local wages and rents increased overhead costs to the point where they 
consumed a substantial amount of revenue. Powerful local unions negotiated large 
annual rises, especially at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s.  In 1971, for example 
salary costs rose 20% at the Hongkong Bank.  The Osaka and Tokyo branches each 
kept about 90 local staff in the mid-1960s compared to 8 foreign staff at the Tokyo 
office and 4 at the Osaka office.  Along with the much smaller Kobe and Yokohama 
offices the total numbers were 11 foreign staff, 2 regional officers and 212 local staff 
in Japan by June 1971.49  At the end of 1970, however, the Tokyo office decided that 
‘as a long term policy all new staff recruited are females, who do not expect to be 
employed for life, as do the men.  This will eventually make it easier to reduce the 
numbers when necessary’ i.e. when, as was expected, local interest rates fell against 
rising Eurodollar rates.50    
 
Foreign banks’ activity; the case of the Hongkong Bank 
     In the 1960s and 1970s the tight controls on lending and shortage of capital created 
a demand for loans that drew Japanese banks vigorously into the newly established 
Eurodollar market. By September 1960 Japanese banks had obtained Eurodollar 
deposits in London amounting to more than $US200 million, most of which was 
converted to Yen to finance Japanese industrial expansion. Because of higher 
perceived risks, Japanese banks offered 2 per cent over the usual rate to obtain the 
funds but this was still cheaper than borrowing in Japan.51  Japanese also became 
important international borrowers on longer term. In 1961 Sumitomo Metals and 
Kawasaki Steel issued Japan’s first bonds abroad.52  In the two years 1963-64 US 
banks’ long term lending Japan amounted to US$260 million.53  
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     The huge demand by Japanese industry for investment funds, initially for recovery 
from the war and later to finance accelerating growth, also created considerable 
opportunities for profitable international financial intermediation for foreign banks in 
Tokyo.54  The Hongkong Bank provides an example of the nature of this business and 
the obstacles that banks encountered. 
     Even before the Eurodollar market was established, profit on exchange was still 
the major source of income in Tokyo, accounting for more than half of income in the 
first half of 1956 (an increase of 41% over 1955) after the Tokyo and Osaka offices 
were linked to set sales against purchases rather than balancing each set of books.  
Any surplus was lent on through the lucrative inter-bank market in Tokyo where 
interest rates were high.55  In 1957 it was noted that ‘income from this source is 
Tokyo’s lifeblood accounting for 60% of their income’.56  Even with the high taxation 
on profits, this was a lucrative business, although from 1958-60 the spread on 
exchange narrowed and profits were squeezed. 
     The Hongkong Bank was relatively slow to engage in the Eurodollar market. King 
describes how the Tokyo manager had to fly to Head Office for a crash course in how 
the market worked after being alerted to its potential by a French bank.57  In June 
1963 the Tokyo office began operations on the Eurodollar market in London which 
generated ‘free yen’ deposits in Tokyo.  In the second half of 1963 working profit 
increased 40% and total resources were 60% greater than the same period of 1962 due 
to Free Yen deposits by London and New York.  The profit on the utilisation of 
Eurodollar funds was about Y31m for the six months to December due to a gross 
interest differential of 4.9% pa between the cost of borrowing Eurodollars and the 
higher Japanese interbank rate.  By June 1964, the gross return on Eurodollar 
operations was over 7% when the call money rate in Japan rose to 11.55%.  Short 
loans to banks increased from Y70m in 1963 to Y3.5b in June 1964.  The call money 
rate peaked in the second half of 1964 at 12.8% generating a gross return after the 
cost of forward cover on Eurodollar lending of 8%. But this peak soon passed as 
money eased in Japan and grew tighter in London and New York. By December 1965 
the rate on loans to banks and brokers was down to 6.62% pushing the return on 
Eurodollar operations to 2%. Easier money also increased the competition for 
domestic loans by Japanese banks and so net profits slumped from Y159.4m in 1964 
to Y54.1m in 1966, although there was some recovery in the second half of 1967 
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when profit on Eurodollar business amounted to Y75m compared to Y4m in the same 
period of 1966.   
      Foreign banks also used borrowed Eurodollars for loans to first class Japanese 
companies, usually with a guarantee from a local A Class Bank, so-called ‘Impact 
Loans’.  The Hongkong Bank started this in the second half of 1970 and by the end of 
the year such loans amounted to Y8.7b generating a profit of about 3.5% p.a.  The 
huge demand for local capital ensured that this business continued and expanded.  
When the domestic interest rate on loans was too low, the Japanese borrowers made 
compensating interest-free deposits, increasing liquidity and loanable funds and 
thereby raising the banks’ return beyond the nominal rate.58  Most of the Hongkong 
Bank’s loans were arranged in Osaka, but they were transferred to Tokyo’s books 
from April 1970 and Osaka was paid 1% commission for all such business brought to 
the bank.  
     In the years of uncertainty and tight money in the early 1960s the Hongkong Bank 
loaned only to the largest Japanese companies and to reliable foreign companies, 
mainly related to their commercial trade.59 By the end of the decade the Hongkong 
Bank reported increasing competition from both Japanese and American banks.60  In 
April 1967 the Tokyo manager noted that ‘Many of our customers tell us that they are 
frequently approached at managerial level to transfer their business from foreign 
banks; many inducements are offered even to personal account holders’.61  A few 
months later he noted that ‘it is almost impossible for our constituents to refuse in 
cases where, for example a trading firm of the Mitsubishi Group refuses to place an 
order unless the relative business is directed through the Mitsubushi Bank.  We, on 
the other hand, cannot attract business from Japanese banks since we are not eligible 
for the cheap re-finance which they obtain from the Bank of Japan’.62  In 1963, the 
Hongkong Bank decided to close the branch of its subsidiary the Mercantile Bank in 
Tokyo to avoid excessive competition and rationalise the Group’s business.63   
      About 40% of the profits for all foreign banks in Tokyo arose from foreign 
exchange business in the 1970s as they took exploited their advantage in offering 
foreign currency impact loans compared to their domestic competitors.  Foreign banks 
accounted for about 60% of these loans when the market was opened up to domestic 
banks in 1980.  Thereafter, local banks quickly made inroads on the market, pushing 
foreign banks back to a 19% market share by 1984.64
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 The Tokyo Stock Exchange 
 
      The Tokyo Stock Exchange also attracted foreign attention.  The exchange had 
been quite volatile, experiencing a boom during the Korean War and again in mid-
1961 fuelled by newly formed investment trusts.  The ensuing fall in the market in 
mid-1965 rocked the largest securities company (Yamaichi Securities) requiring a 
bail-out by the government and increased regulation of the market.65  In April 1968 a 
surge of foreign investment on the Tokyo Stock Exchange began as foreigners sought 
to profit from Japan’s rapid growth.  There were record purchases of US$20m in that 
month but this quickly accelerated to US$34.5m by June and $60.5m in July.66  Most 
came from the American trust funds but also from European institutional investors 
buying shares in first class electronics, automobile, insurance and camera companies.  
During 1968 the Ministry of Finance granted clearance for $US429m of foreign share 
purchases.67   The market seemed to peak in the first quarter of 1969 but began to rise 
again in the fourth quarter.  In September 1969 alone, US$291m flowed in from 
abroad of which 65% was from Europe, 28% from the USA and the rest from 
elsewhere in Asia.68  However, foreign ownership of shares in listed companies in 
Japan remained below 5% throughout this period and foreign firms were prohibited 
from becoming members of the TSE until 1982.69  Figure 1 shows the stock exchange 
boom in this period.  The boom only broke with rising interest rates after the first 
OPEC oil shock in 1973. 
 
Changes in the 1970s: activity of Japanese banks 
     After the advent of floating exchange rates in 1971 and the accumulation of 
substantial trade surpluses in the early 1970s, Japanese banks became much more 
aggressive in international finance and Japan became a net exporter of capital.  The 
changing position of Japan is clear in the movement of interest rates during the post-
war period shown in Figure 2.70  During the tight money years from 1956-65 call 
money rates in Japan averaged 7.8% p.a. compared to 3.8% p.a. on the Eurodollar 
market.  From 1966-75 money eased in Japan and tightened up elsewhere so that by 
the late 1970s short term rates in Japan were considerably lower than in the US, the 
UK, or the Eurodollar market and Japan became a net international long term lender 
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funded by short term capital inflows as the Yen rose in international markets with the 
mounting current account surplus.  
     With increased liquidity and a rising yen, Japanese banks moved onto a new plane 
of international finance, borrowing heavily on the Eurodollar market to make longer 
term loans at lower interest rates than their competitors in the expectation that the 
US$ would continue to slide against the Yen. At the end of 1971 a consortium of four 
Japanese bank plus Morgan Guaranty Trust made the first long-term loan to a foreign 
company, lending $15.2m to the Trans-Ocean Gulf Corp.  Japanese financial 
institutions also began to arrange syndicate loans and bond issues in Japan for foreign 
governments and institutions, either in concert with foreign banks or independently.71 
By 1973, Japanese banks in London accounted for 8.5% of total banks’ non-sterling 
obligations, rising to 12.3% by May 1974 as they accelerated their Eurodollar 
borrowing.72 The bubble soon burst, however, as Eurodollar rates increased sharply 
and the Bank of Japan imposed new restrictions to curtail this activity.  The new 
international environment also affected foreign banks in Tokyo.  From 1975-79 
profits of foreign bank branches and their share of the Japanese market fell as their 
traditional activities were overtaken by Japanese banks and official controls 
constrained their diversification.73  
     In summary, through most of the period the restrictions on international banking 
frustrated those foreign banks hoping to act as intermediaries with Japanese industry.  
The reluctance of the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance to allow the yen to 
be an international currency further inhibited yen-denominated offshore business.  
Despite the controls, however, there were considerable profits to be made in Tokyo by 
foreign banks re-lending Eurodollars and there was a frustrated demand among 
foreign banks to expand their operations in Japan.  The enthusiastic (but risky) 
activity of Japanese banks in the Eurodollar surge in the early 1970s provoked 
accusations of ‘dumping’ by other international financiers and in the end sparked a 
regulatory backlash by the Japanese authorities.  As a result, the Tokyo financial 
sector remained tightly protected through the next decade.  Nevertheless, up to 1980 
Tokyo rose in the IFC league tables mainly on the strength of the dramatic growth of 
the economy as a whole while Hong Kong maintained its middle-weight position 
despite having only one international bank and a relatively small (although fast-
growing) domestic economy. 
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 Conclusion 
International banking and financial centres arise for a variety of interconnected 
reasons; tax rates, regulation, economies of scale and scope, and domestic demand for 
services.  Their location also depends on factors such as language, culture and 
institutional transparency.  This account has shown that all of these factors influenced 
the performance of Hong Kong and Tokyo in the post-war period.  This paper has also 
tried to add some texture to the characterisation of Hong Kong as a laissez-faire 
paradise and Tokyo as a centre that effectively excluded foreign banks until the 
1980s.  The characterisation of Hong Kong as a free-wheeling and uncontrolled 
international banking market is really only true for the decade up to 1965. However, 
the huge demand for wholesale financial services in East Asia by this time meant that 
these new restrictions did not prevent a massive influx of foreign financial institutions 
into Hong Kong both through representative offices, equity partnerships and buy-outs 
of existing banks, and by new merchant banks and deposit-taking companies that 
engaged in wholesale business exempt from the moratorium and the interest rate 
agreement.  The one aspect where tax policy was disadvantageous also did not have a 
fatal impact.  Hong Kong’s free exchange market, long historical record in 
international commerce, the agglomeration of banks and supporting financial services 
and the use of English remained important sources of advantage for Hong Kong 
through the difficult years of the 1970s.  From 1980, the opening of China and the 
restructuring of the Hong Kong economy away from manufacturing gave further 
impetus to the expansion of the international financial centre.74  Despite its regulatory 
disadvantages after 1965, therefore, the free exchange market ensured that Hong 
Kong persisted as an IFC and was well poised to flourish in the late 1980s during the 
restructuring of the economy after the exodus of Hong Kong’s manufacturing 
enterprise to China.   
     This account has also shown that foreign banks in Tokyo did have opportunities to 
make profits during the 1950s and 1960s despite being much more hampered by 
controls and changes in the pace of liberalisation both before and after the oil crisis of 
1973/4. However, the operation of Tokyo as an international financial centre was 
hampered by exchange controls, constraints on offshore business, and the state’s 
resistance to internationalisation of the Yen.  The costs of international banking in 
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terms of tax rates and corporate culture remained high relative to Hong Kong. The 
Japanese authorities initially encouraged international activity by Japanese banks in 
foreign banking centres, but after the first oil crisis these activities were reigned in 
until a further initiative toward liberalisation in the 1980s.  Nevertheless, the huge 
size of the Japanese economy and of Japanese banks pushed the absolute value 
indicators of Tokyo’s international activity into third place in the world as an 
international financial centre.  
     In the 1990s, the Japanese banking system was exposed as having a large balance 
of non-performing debt when the ‘bubble’ economy of the 1980s burst.  Lack of 
transparency and inadequate disclosure and risk assessment weakened the Japanese 
banking system and undermined confidence in the Japanese economy as a whole, 
aspects the Big Bang initiative launched in November 1996 aimed to rectify.75  This 
weakness and a consequent drop in profits by foreign banks led to a significant 
deterioration in Tokyo’s status as an international banking centre, causing it to fall 
from third to fifth place between 1990 and 2000. Hong Kong meanwhile replaced 
Tokyo in third place.  This change was due to a decline in Tokyo both as a 
headquarters for international banks and as a host for foreign banks.  The number of 
the world’s top 300 banks headquartered in Tokyo fell 30% from 20 in 1990 to 14 in 
2000.  In the same period the number of offices of foreign banks also fell in Hong 
Kong, but to a lesser extent – from 65 to 48.76
     The fall in the number of foreign banks represented in Hong Kong reflects that it 
also was challenged by financial crisis in the 1990s, particularly the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 that has had serious longer term repercussions on the domestic and 
regional economy.  The banking system, however, emerged relatively unscathed due 
to the underlying strength and diversification of portfolios.77  Nevertheless, the 
experience has led to a reassessment of the regulatory and supervisory regime in 
Hong Kong.  The response is a continued relaxation of regulations, particularly 
barriers to entry by foreign banks and controls on interest rates.  This liberalisation is 
to be accompanied by strengthening the Hong Kong Monetary Authority’s 
supervision, again aimed particularly at foreign banks operating in Hong Kong. At the 
same time the HKMA has committed itself to measures to formalise deposit insurance 
and lender of last resort functions (former planned for 2002 and latter completed June 
1999) to lessen the chances of a future run on the banking system.78  
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Table 1: Banks’ Foreign Assets: Share in total reporting countries’ foreign assets 
 1961 1965 1970
UK 16.71 17.1 25.1
USA 29.52 23.6 8.58
Japan 5.03 5.70 4.42
France - 4.33 6.79
Switzerland 8.71 8.33 9.46
Luxembourg 0.74 0.89 2.48
Bahamas - - 4.83
Lebanon - 1.34 0.43
Bahrein - - 0.4
Singapore - - 0.35
Hong Kong 1.16 1.14 0.83
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbooks 
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 Table 2: Branches of foreign banks in Tokyo and Hong Kong in 1965: Source Region 
 USA UK Europe Other Asia 
Tokyo 6 1 1 7 
Hong Kong 5 2 5 29 (+6 PRC Chinese) 
Source: Bankers’ Almanac 1965/66 
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Table 3: World Rankings Based on Number of Foreign Bank Offices 
 Hong Kong Tokyo London New York Paris 
1955  4 8 1 2 3 
1965  3 7 1 2 4 
1970 (Choi et. al) 8 3 1 2 3 
1980 5 2 3 1 7 
1990 4 3 1 2 7 
2000 3 5 2 1 8 
Source: 1955 and 1965 Bankers’ Almanac. Other dates include only the world’s top 
300 banks.  SR Choi, A.E. Tschoegl and C.M. Yu, 1986, ‘Banks and the World’s 
Major Financial Centers, 1970-1980’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, CXXII, 1988, 48-
64. SR Choi, DK Park and A.E. Tschoegl, 1996, ‘Banks and the World’s Major 
Banking Centers, 1990’, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, CXXIII, 774-793. SR Choi, DK 
Park and A.E. Tschoegl, ‘Banks and the World's Major Banking Centers, 2000’, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130 (3): (Forthcoming).
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